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ABSTRACT
'I'his pxper models equiGbriutn selection for an extensive form game as a special correlation
d,~viro u:un,~d a xPlerliun d,~viee. :1 sPlorliou dPVire Felerls a st.rat,~v pruGle iu a form of
COIInPpFUS. ~1 set ofstrategy profiles selected by a selection device is called a robust selection
if thP devire ha.. a largesl domain of alteruative reasonable strategies. A robust selection
always Pxists. A robust sPlPCtion rontains Nash equilibria only and sometirnes eliminates
uurea,onablP `ash ur iweu sPquPUtiaJ cn{uilibria. Altentatively tu forward induction, the
robusl st~lertion rrit.Priou provides a roodel in which a pla,vcr vicws a ckviation as a siRn of
au alternative play. :1n application to signaling games is presented in cornparison with the
('ho-l;reps tPSI.
JEL ClssaiScation Number: OZti
Key Words: PxtensivP form RamP, eyuilibrium selPCtion, correlation device, altPrnative
play, forward induction.3
1. INTRODUCTION
The pr~rblem uf oquilihritnn selectiun is ouc of the reul,ral issnes iu noucuoperauve game
theury. lu the xbseucr ofcooperation, players face a coordination problem of which equióó-
rium they play. To Mrlve I he problem, lhe players obviously need lo share some knowledge.
As l3ernheim (19R~}), PParce (1984), Tan and Werlang (1988) showed, however, the assump-
tion of common knowledqe aboui players' rationaGty does not ensure attainment of a Nash
Pynilibriutn. So the assumption of common knowledge about an equilibrium itse!! has been
a convenliou to avoid getting into the issue.
In tLe late KOs, a serics oí works for extensive form game refinement appeared under
the name of forward induction. A short list of these works includes Aanks and Sobe!
( 1987). ('ho and h:reps (1987), Farrell (1985), and Grossman and Perry (1986). Sirangely
enough, on I hn oue hand, furward induction att.empts to find iu a deviation [rom a presumed
equilibrium an explicable intention ofthe deviatíon. On the other hand, forward iaduction
(ollows the cunvenliou Lo assume explicitly or implicitly common knowledge about the
presumed equilibrium itsPlf. lf an eyuilibrium is really presumed and commou knowledge,
there should nut he nny intention of deviatiou. 'Phis is a aevere logical inconsistency in
forward induct.ion. 'I'he game of Fiqure I taken (rom van Dazume (1989) illustrates the
point. 'Che RamP has two sequentiaJ equlibria in pure strategies; at -(R,.S;I,w) and
a~ -(I„1-b'; r,..). Both rv{uilibria cazry their own forward inducticn argumerts to refute
Lhe other unr. 7'o refute the equ{ibrium a~ and advocate the eyuilibrium ot, one niight
argue that, by taking the out-of-equilibrium action kin the equilibrium o2, p(ayer I can send
player ll an effect.ive signal rlaiming that he will play S of at since a succeasive play (S; w)
is the only aensible hope for player 1 to be better off than the presumed equilibrium play.
To reAtl,e the eyuilibrium nt aud advocate the Pquilibrium oa, however, one might argue
that, by taking the ont-of-equilibrium action r in the equilibrium al, player II can send
player I au elfertive niqual cla.iming that. he will play s of o' sinc.e a sucressive pla,y (!., W; n)
is the only sensible hope for player II to be better off than the presnmed equiGbrium play.
The arguments contradict each other.
'I'he purpwe of this paper is to propose an alternative approach to extenaive form
game refincmenl. instead of pursuing an alternative play given the assumption oícommon
knowlMlgo abuul an Pqnilibriutn itself, we conceive an exogenous random device which4
selecls reasonable equilibria among alternatives for players, and we h,vpothesize that the
random device is common knowledge. The idea of using a tandom device to build a Bayeaian
fotmdat.ion of rational play was originally proposed by Aumann (1974, 1987). Aumann's
correlated equilibrium, however, supports a play which Nash equilibrium never generates.
Wc rostrict a class of random devices to the class of ones called selection devices, whicó
,yield consensus about a play among the players. Then we define the most reasonable device
in the restricted class and call a set of strategy profiles selected by the device as a robust
r.eleclion. 'I'h~~ critrrion of rubust M~leet.ion is Ihat. the strategy pruliles are selected from a
largest domain of alternative reasonable strategies. We show that a robust selectíon always
exists and that the rohust selection criterion ensures attainmcut of a Nash equilibrium
and sometimes Pliminates unreasonable Nash or even sequential equilibrium. Without the
logical incousistency of forward induction, the robust selection criterion provides a model
in which a player views a deviatíou as a sign oF an alternative play.
'I'he paper is organized as follows. Section 2 redefines Aumann's corre)ation device for
the purpose of extensive form game analysis. Tben section 3 restricts the correlation device
to a selection device. ln section 4, we present the central notion of robust selection. Section
5 provides the main results o[ the paper concerning characterizations of robust selection.
In section 6, we discuss an application of robust selection to simple signaling games. All
the proofs except for Lemma 1 are in the appendix.
2. CORRELATION DEVICE
ln this section, we redefine Aumann's (1974, 19l{7) correlation device for extensive form
games. The primitive ohject of our analysis is a finite extensive form game C with perfect
recall. Let I be the set of pla,yers in the primitive game C. Due to the Kuhn (1953) theorem,
the stratrgic opportunity for player i E I is rcpresented by the set !,'; of behaviorally mixed
strategics. ('onsider any uonempty finite subset U; o( ~'; for eac6 player i E I a.nd define
a product D e jj~Er D; C ~- r[;Er E;. Consider any probability distribution q E A(D)
where .~(U) denotes the set oi probability diatributions over the set U. (Note that the
distribntion y is not necessarily a product measure.) Associated with the primitive game
C via the pair (U,q), we define a game C(U,q) as follows. First Nature selects a profile
n-(a;);EI E D randomly according to the probability distribution q. Then Nature informs5
each playcr i ptivately of the part o; in the realization o. Then the players play the primitive
Rame l:.
an exteuded game G(U,y) is a well defined finite extensive form game with perfect
recall. The various notion~, liko a xtrategy and a belief system, of noncooperative game
theon. apply to it in the usual fashion. :1 player i's strategy in the extended game C(D,q)
is a mapping s; E~. ';~' which, fur each realized o; E D;, prescribes a behaviorally mixed
strat.egy s;(a,) E ~`; uf the primitive gatne G. .~ special strategy .9~ such that .9~(0;) - a;
for any a; E U; is called an implementation of D;. '1'hat is, in an implememtation, player
i adopts `aturn~ssuggestion n;.
:1 belief system is defiued as follows. Let .l' be the set of decision nodes in the primitive
qame C. Then a decision node of the extendcd game C,(D,q) is a pair (i,a) E Y x D,
which means that r is mached whcn Yature selects o. A belief system o( the extended
Rame G( D.q) is a mapping Ir :.~' x U-[0. 1] such that
Vi E i.b'n, E D,.Vh E H,: ~ ~ N(T.Irt;,r.-;)) - 1
,e~.~-,en-.
where H; deuotes the rollection of information sets for player i in the primitive game G
and n-, E U-; denotes a profile (a~)i~; E ]j~~ U~. Let ~1U,4) deoote the set of belief
systems of G(D, y).~
;Vow we define a eorrelatiou dcvice for au extensive form game as follows.
Deflnition
For any fiuite extensive form game G with perfect recall, let D be a nonempty finite
product subset of ~', {qi}i`t be a ronvergent sequence in ~(D), and {pr)~t be a
ronvergeut sc(tUP11rP of Iri F 4(1J.9t). Let W-{C ye.lei 1}~'r. '1'he pair (U,p) is
callPd a correlation device for G if and only ifyr is fully mixed and pr is consistent witó
the prufile v' o( implementatiuns in C(D,qi) in the Kreps and Wilson (1982) sense.
'fhe limit Ir - lirnt-,,, ~~ is called a consistent beliefs of G(D,q) where q - limr~~qt.
''I~he sot ~( U, q) does not depend on a specificxt.ion of q.
'~ "fhe nutiuu is au ~~xlenxion of th~ consistonry nol.iou intmduced by Kreps and Wilscm
( 141K'1). Wo use the lerm wilhout mentioning Ihe associated spM~ial stratPgy profile .v' of
irnplemeutations. '1'he associated strategy profilP is alwaye the pro(ile ~' throughout the
pap~,r.r,
An interpmtatiun is straightforward. The limit probability distribution q is au Aumann's
correlation dPVice witó a support in D. (Note that the support of q dces not necessarily
coiueide with the set D.) l3y nsing the exogenous device q, the players play the extended
Rame C(D,q). Furtherrnore, since C(D,q) is an extPnsive form game, the players form
thcir beliefs uot unl,Y (`x ante hut alsu duriug a play. 'hhc cuusistent belief p implicd by W
captures this extension ot Aurnann's correlation device.
3. SELECTION DEVICE
In this .ection, we model eyuilibrium selection as a special type of mrrelation device. We
imagiur~ t hlat. Riveu a primilive Ratno C. the placers Iafé fominun knowledge about how to
play so that they need to seek some form of ronsensus. Imagine t.hat the players somehow
havo a nonrmptc finitc set C'u C~' o( candidate strategy profiles to bc played in C. The
players try to reach consensus on one of stratagy profiles in a nonempty subset C' C Co h,y
diseardinq those candirlate strategy profiles in C'o ` (". A corrPlation device can be seen
as a random device to create Ynfh a cOnSCTISIIti If thP following ronditions hold.
Deflnition
F'or any finite extensive form game (; with perfect recall and any nonempty finite
sub,r`ts C' C CA of strategy profiles. IPt ( D, `~) be a rorrelation device for C suc6 that
('~ C U. '1'he triple (( '~, U, y) is ralled a selection device of C" if and only if
( I 1 q(~r) ? 0 if aud unly if n ~(", and
('1) liml,.~ ~ v'ln1 -. -- - I fur an} n rt,
A-,EP-,
9~t~,.a-.) - ( ) ~EI E (". all(1
(a) thP part .v,(rt;) - n; of implemcntation of U; in C(U,q) is sc~yuentially rational
with respect to p for any i E I and any a; E U; `(proj;(Co), proj;(C'))
whcre proj; is an operalor which projects a set in ~ to the space E;. The set C.' is
ealled a select.ion by (('o, U,1~).
An interprelation ofthp conditiuus is straightforward: (1) (" is an exhaustive set of possible
consensus, (Y) auy realiration e- (o;);Er E C' generates each player's pwterior given his
private iuformation o, thal the ccrosensus n haa been reached almost surely, and (3) any
strategy choice which is made accurding to the cortelation device must be implemented
sequontially rationall,y unless it is the one discarded by the device.7
4. ROBUST SELECTIOIV
Por a given primitive Rame, not. all the selPCtion devices (Cb, D, ~) are reasonable since we
have not imposed any rationale on the choice of C~. In this aection, we define a set M of
reasonable salection devices and then propose a robustness criterion about which selection
devices are most reasonable in M.
F'irst of all, if a triple (('o, D, p) is a selection device of C'o ftself, then the triple should
be in ,bl sinee the choice of C~ is justified as a choire of reasonable consensus. Let Mo
be a set of all Iriples (('n, U,r,) which are selection devices of ('n themselves. Further-
more, if there are alternative seleetion devices in .b1n which support different selections,
we sxy that ,ome dispute of eqailibrium selertion remains unsolved in .ti1o. Therefore, if
auoth,~r srlecliun device u,lvos lh,~ dispute, thi, device sl[ould also bo iu Af. F'onnallv let
.b1 [ be a set of all soleetio[[ devires (C'o, D, ti) for which there exists a finite collection
((.ot !)[ t~l ) ,,. (~.(Ih" !)h' ~h') E .1I~ Sn('h (hat ~'u - Uk-rDk. We repeat the procedurc
of defining ,tl[ frum ,tifn to cmato a soyuence {:N"};;-n. Since the sequence is nondecreas-
ing, we set .tf - U~o:1f".
!n the set af o( reasonable sclertion devices. we define the most reasonable ones by
the following robustness criterion.
DeBnition
Fbr any finite e~xtensivP form game G with perfect recall, let bf be the set of reasonable
selection devices. Let ( C'u, U, Si) E M1f be a reasonable selection device oí some set C'
of stratPgy profiles. The set (" is called a robust selection if and only if, for any
(C~~, D', t,i) E Af with D C U', there exists (Co~~, D", p") E M such that D' C D"
and (C'o~~,U",Ii') is a selection device of C'.
An interpretation of the eritcrion is the following. Consider any eelection C' by a reasonable
sc~lection device (('o,U,t,) E A1. Suppose that there exist alternaitve selections and that
tbere exist.s a reasonable selection device (C~~, U',W') E M which aolves a dispute between
the selectiou C" and the alternative selections. Then if there is uo way to overturn the
n,~lrctiun uf (('n',Il'.tii ) auJ conrlude tho s(~I,~ction C" b,y solvin~ the despute by twmc
rcasonable selection device (C~~~, D",gi') E tt1, the selection (" ís aot the most reasonable
se~leet ion.5. MAIN RESULTS
'I'his seY-tiou presents the main results of this paper concerning characterizations of robust
selection. 'fhe main results consist of three parts; existence, safficiency criterion, and
reli nemeut-
First, the existence of robust selection is far from trivial, since in the recursive(y defined
set :t! there must exi,t a selection device for whirh no more dispute mmains unsolved. Let
G be auy liuite extensive Corm game with perfect recall. To establish the existence of
rnlnrvt w~lr~ctiun Grr (:, nute first Ihat any seqnr~idial rrluilibrinm ( rr,(4) in C qcnerates a
tríplr (('~, U, y) E.Ntr by taking ("-~'~r - U-{a}, qr(o) - 1 for any ! E N, and
p, -(r for any I E N. ('all such a triple ati a primitivr seleetion device. Hence the following
nonernptiuesa of the set al is immediate.
Lemma 1
For any fiuite exteusive form game C with perfect recall taken as the primitive game,
any sequcntial equilibrium strategy proftle of game G forms a singleton selectioo by a
printit.ive .electinu dovicr in .l(u.
Civen l.emma l, crucial for the existence of robust selection is the existence of "largest"
sefection device in M. 1Ve shall develop a sutficiency condition that a selection device is
"largest" iu :M1f. Some notations are in order- For any noninitial node x in the primitive
game C, let p(z) denote the node which immediately precedea node z and let a(z) denote
the action which is taken at node p(r) immediatel,y before reaching node x. If there further
Pxists an immediate prederessor p(p(z)) of node p(z), we write it as p2(x). Repeatedly for
any m E N, if them exists an immediate prPderessor p(pm-t (x)) of ncxle p~-t(x), we write
it :u: p"'(r). Let m(r) be the tota number of predeeessors of node x. Now consider any
i E I, any h E H;, and au-y r E h. F'or any strategy profile n-; E ~'., of other pla,yers, we
detinr a drwialiun ittdex~ uf n-; to r by
ó(z,rr-,) - ~{ 1 c m C ra(z)I t(Pm(z)) ~ i and n;(v",(r))(o(Pm-t (z))) - 0}
where i(p'"(z)) denoles the player who owna uode p'"(z). Let ó(h,a-;)- minrEr, 6(z,o-;).
~ r1 similar index was proposed by McLennan (1985).9
h'or any (possibh~ infinite) product subset D-; of `,'-;, lat ë(x, D-;) - mina-,Ep- 6(2,0-;).
'I'hen thc following criterion is the sufficieucy rondition.
Lemma 2
Lot (('f', D, t,) E .til he a solertion deviceof a sN, C`. Suppor,e that, (or any (('n~. D', p') E
A4 with U C D'. it holds that 6(x, U-; )- ë(z, D!;) for any i E I, any h E H;, and
anv r E h. 'Chcn (" i, a robust selection.
'1'he criteriou uf Lomma Y establishes the following existence result of robust selection.
Theorem 1
Por :uiy' liuite exten,icc furm Kame wit.h perfect recalf talen as the primitivP game,
there alwavs exists at least one robust selection.
tiecond, in applyiuR thP notiou o( robust selection, it is useful to know when the
criterion of Lemma Y holds. F'or this purpa9e, we shell develop lower bounds to deviation
indexes. For t his development, we introduce the following variation of the rationalizability
concepts proposed by Hernhpim (19f34) and Pearre (19A4).
pe8nition
l.et D- i1;Er D; be any (possibly infinite) product subset of w'. Then any a; E D; ie
said to be si~yuentially rationalizable in D if and only if there exist a nonempty finite
proflnct subsot U' - r],Er D~ C U and a probability distributiou q' E ~(D') such that
a, E D' and that s;(a;) - a; is seyuentially rational with respe~ct to some consistent
belief ~' in the game (;( U',q'). Let iQ;(D) denote the set of atrategies in D; which are
sequentially rationalizable in D. Let 3t(D) - }-j;Ei ii;(U).
FollowinR I3ernheim (19R4) and PParce (19ít4), we rOn(Y'IYe Of re{)eat(YI applirations of
sequential rationalizability. For auy n E N, let i2" denote the n time operation of fii. Define
a seyuencP {~F?"(`,')}n r of subsets in .~,'. The se~yuence is nonincreasing in n. Therefore we
define the (ollowing counterpart of a Bernheim-Yearce rationalizable set.
I)e8 nition
'Che sPt I?" - fln r!R"(L') is called the seyuentially rationalizable set.Io
I'he ke1' ub.crvatiuu lu drwolop luwor buunds lu d~'vixliuu iudexi's is Ihc fulluwinK 1'ar~t Lhat
any strate~p supported by a rea.couable seleetion device ((~, D, ~~) E M is sequentially
rationalizable in its domain D.
Lemnia 3
D-~li( U) for any 1~'", D, y,) E.M1l.
Lemma :; p,ives us the fullowiuq fonu uf upper buuud to the domains of selectiun devices in
,11.
Lemma 4
1) C~h" for a.ny 1~~". D.t,) E.1(.
The upper bulnld u( Lernma -I tirnes as a restricted cersion of the criferion of Lemma 2 lu
follow..
I.emma 5
Let (" br' a:elr'ctiun ht (('". D, y,) E.tl. If h(r. D-;) - hlz,Yi',) for any i E I, any
h E!!,. aud any r E h. then C" is a robu~t selection.
As a rurullan' uf Lonun~l .í, wr. alsu hav~' a,ullici,'ot ~nnditiou lhat a robnsl solection is
unique.
Lemma e
Let (" hr a robnst solrction by (('", D, y,) E~til where D- ~~EI D;. Assume that
b(T. U..; )- 6(f, I?' ;) for any i E I, any h E fI„ aud any x E h. Consider any selection
C"'. Suppose that, for any (C"', D', ~' ) E M by which the set C'' is a selection where
D' - ~;Er D;, there exists no (('"'~, D", ti') E M such that n ~EI(D; U D;) C D" and
C"' is a selectiou b,y (C'"", D", g,"). Theu C'' is not a robust. selection. Especially if
the 511p110tiltlOll Iti (Ilet fOr alll' ("' ~(", tbeu Lhe set (." is tbe nniyue robust selection.
Third, we present a characterization of surviving equilibria in a robust selectíon. The
ba.tiir result is the following.11
~heorem 2
k'ur any finite extensive form game with perfect recall taken as the primitive game, any
stratPgv profi)e in a robust selection is a Nash equiGbrium of the primitive game.
Nute howPVOr thal., in mutrasl with thP ronvontional argutnent for Nash Pquilibrirun, thP
notion of robust selection does not presumP that a rational strategy becomea common
knowlPdp;P amunR thr playPrs. Actnally t.hP r,pposil.P is mom oftPn tI1P f:ucP. NamPly, for
thP rasP of ~U~ ~ I, Pven if it ie thr fact that a rPalizatiou o E(" aysigns each player i a
robust sPlertion component o; E proj;(("), this fact is not common knowledge among the
playPrs, since there is a possibiiity that a.nother strategy profile o' E D with v; - a; but
o' ,~E rr-; is act ually aelected even though the possibility is of probability zero.
A virtue of the robust selection criterion as a refinement of Nasó equilibrium is to
avoid the lop,ical inconsistenry of forward induction. For example, conaider the game of
I'iRnre I, for which sPrtion 1 showed that ïorward induction suffers from its own conflicting
implicatiun of both a~ and n3 refuting each other. In contrast, thP set C,` -{ot} is a
robust seleetion but a' is never an element of a robust selection for the following teason.
SiucP both nr and cr2 arP sPquential Pquilibrium strategy profiles, Lemma 1 guarantees that
the}~ arP supportrvl by somo primitive selection devices in Mo. Then construct a following
triplP (C'o,D.f,). tiM ('u - {ot,r,Z} aud D - {(R,S),(L,W)} x {(l,ur),(r,s),(r,w)}.
1'ake 9e as q~(R.S':l,w) - 1- 3ce - fi - Ei, 4e(R,S;r,m) - cé. 9e(R,S;r,s) - e~ and
qr(o) - rr for any other o E D where cr ia a small positive number converging to zero.
1'akP !rr as a li reps ancl 14iIson (19~32) consistent belief ofG( D, qt ). Then sj( R, S) -(R, S),
.~jt(l,v') -(l,,r), and si~(r,u~) - ( r,u,) are all sPyucntially ratioual with respcrt. to p-
limr ..,,.~ct, sinee pl~'.I(R.,S),(r,u~)I) - u(j,l(R,.S),(r,v,))) - 1, l~(v',((R,S)~(l~w))) -
Idy.((II..S).(l.rn))) - l, and ~(v'.(IL.N'),(r,u~))) - u(FL((1t,S),(r,w))) - 1. 1[ence
thP triple (("'.D,g~) is in .11, supporting C". Note that any strategy at of player I auch
that oi(R) ~ 0 and at(W') ~ 0 must be al ~?)tl(~') and so ot ~~t~, since L dotninates
( R, W). Heuce h( y', Dt )- b( y', 82~ )- 1 and all other deviation indexes are zero. By
LPmma 5, therefore, we conclude that C` is a robust seJection. Furthermore, Lemma 4
guarautees thal no (C'u~. D', t,') E M allows pISYPr I LO put positivP probabitities ou R and
N' simultaneously. HPnCP LPwma 6 with the above (('o,D,t;,) E ~f1 applies to conclude
that auy ("' containing a- ia not a robust selection, sincP player 11 is forced to believe that12
he is not at y' but. at y in auy (C'~", D",gi~r) of Lemma 6.
'1'he refinement power of the robusl selection criterion is very limited for some games.
An examplP is the game of F'igure 2.5 The game hab the unique aubgame perfect equilibrium
or -( D. 2 ll t 27'; zh} 2t). However we can support another strategy profile o~ -(A,T; t)
b,y a robust selection C' -{0[,02} s Therefore the robust selection criterion is not nested
Pven in the subgame perfect equilibriutn. The example also illustrates that the robust
selection criterion dOP.9 pOt aatisf,y the backward induction property. If the players takes
out tho proprr subgame' a.fter D a.nd conduct a robust selection,'Iheorem 2 gnarantees
that the uniyue ;Vash eyuilibrium ( jH} ZT; 2ht zi) is selected. '[he entire game, however,
admits thP positive possibilit.y that (T,t) is intended in the ptoper subqame although the
propor subgame is reached wil.h zcro prohahilil.,y in this faseB
e. APPLICATION TO SIGNALING GAMES
One of the fir,ld, in which forwa.rd induction arguments have had dramatic succPSS is the
rolinemcnt (ur signaling games. Au exaanple is the following labor market signaling game
examined by ('ho and Kreps ( 19R7). 'There are three players; a worker (player I) of either
t,vpe tt, or ly~pe tt~ E Xf (tL c ty) and two symmPtric firms (player iI and player III).
First hature moves aud selects a typc of the worker with a probability p E (0,1) of ty.
Heing privately informed of t,he realized type, then, the worker chooses hie education level
F E Nt. 'fhe e~ducation level becomes common knowledge. Finally the symmetric firms
bid a wage rr E H} for hiring the worker in a Bertrand competition. The type t worker
s 1 owe t.he cxample to Eric van Damme.
s('unsl,ruct a triplc (Co, D, ~) by taking t~ - {0[,02}, D-{(D, ZH } 2T), (A,T)} x
{Zh } lt,t}, qr(o) - 1-'lcr if o- or or nz and q[(o) - tr otherwise, and tat as a
l~reps and W'il,on ( 198'l) consist.ent belief of C(D,qi) where e[ is a small poaitive number
converginp to ~ero. All parts of implementations e` are sequentially rational with respect
tn ti - limr-. ,, l~ ~ o.pociall,y befause t~(y. (~ H f 1'r;t) )- t~(y', ( ~ Il } Z7; t)) - 1.. Hcncc
the triplo is in dfo, supporting C'. Since all the deviation indexes are zero, Lemma 2
guarantr~es that (" is a mhust seleftion.
~ W~~ a.rr tr~st.inK t.he proprrty (1411 ) argucyl hy huhlberq xnd Mertrora ( 19Rti).
"'I'he backward indnrt.ion propert,y holds for a certaiu flaas Of gaBles. ('onsider a generic
perfect inforrnat.ion gamo such that the backward induction procedure selects the unique
sPynoutial equilibrium strategy profilc o'. Then the singleton set {e'} is the uniyue robust
,election. 'l'he prouf ia by shrnving that á'" -{o'}, by a sirnilar argwnent to the one in
Suehiro ( l99'l).13
gets a payoff ur(r,u~) and the synunetric firrns get a payoff te - w from hirinq him. The
firms hxve zero rPServation payofCs. We assume that ur(e, w) is sttictly decreasing in e,
strictly incmasing in u,, strictly concave in (c,w), and has a maximum (ei(~3),wi(p)) on
a line rr - ifc for any fr, ~ d ~ trr. We alsri assume the "single crossinq property" that
ur,,(c,u~) has x stmper indifference curve than ur„(e,ur) at any (e,w). Cho and Kreps
( 19ri7) exatniued a separatiug ertuilibriwn in which the tt, worker chooses ei~(t~,), the ty
worker chases e~N(ty), which is a maximum of urN(e,w) on the line w- tye given a
constrainl ui~ (r, tr) C nr~ (rrr (tl, ).t~,r~~.(t1.)), and the firtns bid a wage tl,ti~ ( fl.) to the
education Icvel cir ( tr,) and a wage t yeiH(ty ) to Lhe education level e~y (ty). They ahowed
that, for any p E(U, 1). the orrtrome by the separating equilibriutn is the only one which
survives the ('ho-l~reps criterion.
This result is puzzliug. Consider a degenerate game iu which thete is a t~ worker
only. 7'hen the only seusible outcome is the one in which the tl, worker chooses ejl(t~)
and the finus bid tr-r~~ ( f~.). 'Che original sigualing game with p E (U, I) close enough to
zeru represeuts a near-by situatiou to the degeneratc game. One will expect Lhat the t~
workcr behaves similarly to what he dces in the degenerate game and lets the ty worker
clo whatever he likes as long a.q t.hem is no point for the t~ worker to mimic the ty worker's
behavior- This is exactly what Cho aud hreps ( 19R7) predict. But the situation is reversed
Cor the other degenerate game in which there is a ty worker only. In this degenerate game,
the only sensible outcome is the one in which the ty worker chooses eiN(ty) and the firms
bid t ye~H (ly ). One would expect that, in the original gante with p E (U,1) close enough to
one, thc ty worker behaves similarl~~ to what he does in the degenerate game and lets the
t~, worker do whatever he likes. If uri(ei,r(ty),tyciH(t~t)) ~ uec(eéc(t~),tLeic(tt)), this
expectation implies that a pooling equilibrium would prevail. Irrespective of how close to
one thc probability p is. however, no pooling equilibrium survives the Cho-I~reps criterion.
In contrart, the robnst ,electiuu criteriun Rives us the following results9, which fit our
int.uitiou hett,,r.
9 A conjectnre nf the results was oriqinall}- sug};ested to the author by John Roberts.14
Yroposition
I'ur any p E(l). I). Ihr~re alway, exist. a rubust ,eleetiou which supports thP sepa-
ra,ting oulcome of Cho and Kreps ( 1987). Furtherrnore, if u,,.(eiN(tr~),tHeix(ty)) C
urr (' i, ( r r, ).l ~,' i,, ( rr. )). 4he soparatiug uutrome of Cho aud 6reps ( 1987) is the onl,y
outcumr, supported by a robust selection for any p E (0,1). On the other hand, if
uh.(Ei„(~rf),tNCi„ÍtH)1 ~ uec(Ei~(tL)-tLei~(tt)). there exist 0 G po G pr G 1 such
thaL
( 1) for any p E(U.po ), the separating outcome of Cho and Kreps (198ï) is the only
outcome supported by a robust selPCtion,
(2) for any p E(Pt, I).:r rubnsl seloction also tiuppurts the pooling uutcometn in which
the worker chooses riH(.9(p)) and 1Le firms bid í3(p)eiH(~3(p)) where we denote
i(p) - pltr t( l - p)tr,.
llre reversr~d result conie, from the fullowing fact. For auy p close to one in the last case,
the ('ho-KrPps criterion UpsPtS the pooling outcome ( riN(í3(p)),d(p)ejH({i(p))) by an off-
r~qnilibrinw pla,c ( r'.lrrr') where r' tiat.is(ie. ur~Ir',Irrr') ~ rerr(ci~~(If(p)),lj(plrir,(d(p)))
aud rer~rle'.lr~r') ~ u,,r(cirr(:i(p)).d(p)ri~~(alp))). 7'hedeviatiou r' isinterpreted b,y for-
w:nd indurliun a, a~ifiual uf the lrr wurker. 'fire play o(only the !rr worker taking r',
howevPr, i. nut a part of a.nY all.ernative Pquilibrimn.tt 'fhe robust selection criterion asks
if Lhr~m i, a,oleclion docice which forms the finus tu believe an alternative play in sucL
a way that the firms' best responses to the alternative play force the pooling outcome to
bP eliruinalyd. "I'here is no such selection device when the tH worker prefers the pooling
outcome to the separating outcome of ('ho and Kreps ( 1987).
trr ~tom geuor:rlh', a..ti is appareuf frnm thP proof, a pooling outrumP is supported if the
f rr wurkcr prr~forti I hr~ puuling uutcume lu lhe aepa.raling outcome of ('ho and Kreps O987).
rt Civen t.he Stiglil.ze critiyue, soute authors, e.g. Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1987)
and ~1atthews, Okuno-F'ujiwara and Postlewaite (1991), have attempted to formaliZe for-
ward induction as a disequilibrium process to an alternative eyuilibrium. Without an
explicit mndol of e~qnilibrium select.ion, howcver, thoso attempts have not succeeded in
avnidinS pu.xiblr eunflícliuR implicat.iuns nf forward indnction.Is
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2 :
Let (" be a,Plectiou by (('u, D,w~) E M assURled in Lemtna 2 where U- ~;EI D;, p-
{c y;.'ir ~},-r. 'I'ako :uw (('o'.I)'.bl) E .1l with D C U' wberr IJ' - r[,EI I)l,p~ -
{G q';,li~ ~}~'t. ('onsider a triple (Co~~,D",p") by taking Co~~ - D" - D'. For such
a Iriple (('o~~,D",g;') to bo a selection devicc of (" in tif, the triplc must satisfy thrne
conditions of selection devices whPre the third condition is now that the part s~(a;) - a;
of implemeutation of D; is sequentially rational with respect to a consistent belief implied
b~. t," fur auy i E I and anc o; E proj;(f"). ~1'e shall roustruct an appropriate p" serving
this purpose.
For each I E IV fixed, Iet a seyuence {,vt r}~xt o( behavior strateg,y profiles in C,(D,qt)
be .urh t hat ..~'' E( InrJ',)f'. fur each i E I xnd each ! E N, lim;~.,,, s~'r - s; for each i E I.
and the sequence generates the Kreps and Wilson (19i32) consistent belief pt in G(D,qt).
` sequeuce {.vt~r~}~ t is de6ned similarlp for the consistent belief li~ in (J( D',yi).
For each t E N fixed, from the sequeures {.v'~t}l.t. {.v'~r~}Wt, we construct q~ E:~(D')
and p~ E 4(I)',y~') as follows. First we define s~'r E(lnt~;)o~ for each i E I and I E N
fised. 1'nr th~~ fix~~d l. find 1 F N.ach that l. ~ I and th:rt
max max max{.~~.t'(~;)(a)-o;(Q)~ S f 11 ~~ ~s~~r(o;)(a)~ eEI ~,ED~ nEA, !
~EI n,ED, aEA,
where ,t; is a aet of actions for pla~-er i in thr primitive game C. It must be possible to
~
find surh an l., sinco th~~ faet t.hat lim;-,~ x~'r (n, )-.c~(a,) - o; ~uarantcws that
lim [ max max max ~s~.i'(a; l(a) - rr;(a)~, - 0
1-~c. ~EI o,ED; aEA,
whereas the fact that n~'r(n;) E Inl~.'; guarantees that
~7 ~7 rr
~ 11 11 ~ LY; (o;)(a)I ~ o.
~EI n, EU, aEA,
'fake any such !, and write il as L(!). '1'hen set
.y'.tn a-~.V''r(a; ) if o; E D;
, ( ) r.l.lrl'(R 1 if o; E D;' ` D;.16
Let s''t~~ -(st'r~~ );Er, ~~'o have a sPyuence {s''t~~}~-t for each fixed t E N.
7'hen some notations are in order. Let p be the probabiGty distribution over the set
ol' initi:J noder; iu thc primitivo Rame C. Fix any t,! E N. Take any i E I and any h E fl;.




to denote thf' pmbability that node y is reachPd in the primitive p,ame C when player j~ i
playa a strateRy .v~'r (?~ ) E Inl~'~ and player i t.akes atl ar.tion leading to node y with
probability one wheneYPr necessary. Similarly, we define




wh('n wo rcplace the ulappinRs .,~'r for j~ i in x~'r(y,?-;) by the mappings sj'1.
Vow wc define c y',',1(~ ~ for each t E N fixed. ('onsider any i E I and any h E ff;.
Fiud Ir.?-; ) E h x U-; and B E R surh that
Vy E h.Vri-, E D-;; limsop xr,r(y,n-~) G!1,
r-~ xr.tl2.?-~)
and write it as (rr',?h; ). It must be pOSSlbI( LO find Such an (2,?-;) rincc h x D.-; is finite.
F~urlhennore, wr claim that there exists H' E K such that
Vp E I(,Vo-, E U' ;; limsup xl~(y.?-~) C fi'
t-a, xa.tlr",?~~)
for the followin~ reason. ('onsider any y E h and any ?-; E U~;`U-;. Suppose that there
exists 1 G rn G ne(y) such that i(pm(y)) ~ i, ?;(p..ty))(rx(p"`-t(y))) - 0, and ?;(yT(y)) E
fl~InTlv)) `I!'tnTtvll. ~1'h('n t.he choice' of L(l) in the fOI1FLNCLI(Itl (If p','n guarantf.rs that
vr.t"
(?dnTly(I)ío(Pm-t(y)))
41.L1q' (~ o m-
lim ~Inm(y)) - lim ~(v~lv)1 (n~(vq)( (p t(Y)))
-0.
t-x xl.t(r".?-~) 1-.,o xe.t(i".?"~)
1'herefore wP n1USt haYe
II
xe.rly,?-~ )
lim - 0. r,x, xl,t(j".?r', )tiu, bi' Ir11inK.lly,tr-,) -- {) E I`{r}~o~ E I)~ `U~ xud J - t({í„(yl) fursouu~ I L m c
nt(y)), suppuse that (r~(n(p"`-1(y))) 1 p for any j E J(y,o-;) and any 1 C na G m(y)
r:uch that j - i(pm(y)). Let o~; - argtnino-,En-, b(y,à-;). Then, ïor any j E J(y,o-;)
fixod, it must be a1EO the case that tr~(r2(pm-t(y))) ) 0 for any 1 C m ~ m(y) such that
j- i(pm(y)). Otherwise, b,y defininq a' i-(o~,o!'{~ J}) E D' ;, we would be able to have
~(y,U';) 5 h(y,a'i) ~ h(y,?v;) - ó(y,~-;),





is boundPd where (oJty"- 1, o-{; yu~t o"-, )) E D'; is a strategy proGle obt.ained from o-; by
replafin~ a~ by a~ (ur ali l E .l(y, a-, 1. `ot.e 1ha.f 16c~ pruba.bilitV rr'~~(y. ( aJI Y."-J' ?-í ~ 1u.rl y,"-,1) )
rontain, the expressiuns ..~~~,,,tyll unly for any l G m C m(,y) sufh that i(p'"(y)) ~
t~,,~-,1 rr p i. '1'hl~reforr thfm t~xititti o.-, E U--, ,uch tLat at,f(y.(o a- . w
~Iv."-,1' {~I lv."-.1)) -
( L'o-,)
xt,l(.y~R ~ ). {jellfe
~i~tl!ha ,) f ~~1(.4.n-.1 7rt,t(y,atY~„-~1)~
lim.up - 1 ti - liw sup Il n v t-x xt.Az',?-i) t-x Ar.t(y~(?r(Y,"-,)'?-{i}ur(v.Q-J)) ~t.f(zh,ohr)
is buunded. 1'his establishes the claim that the bound B' exists. Without loss of generality,
we can replafe lim supt-,x b,y limt-,,~,. Therefore we can define a number











whete the number B(t) is well defined since
t1i E I,Vh E Il,.da, E D;; ~ ~ yt(o,.ó-;) lim
xt.tly.d-;) ~ qt(at,oh;) 1 0.
f-.~ 7ft.t(2h~?hi) - yEh r'-, ED-,
Now we define qi' E ~(D') by
xftrl9e(a) ~( 1- yt~tl )qt(a) if a E D
9e~'(a) -
xr~tlqi(a) if a E I)' `D.18
'1'hrn, fur Pafh t E N. IPt tr~.r be thP bPlirf systrm ronsl.ructed from x'~r~~ by Aa,yen rale in the
RamP l:(U',q'~). We drfine tri - lirn;-..,, tr~;. Obviousl,y p~ E~(U',q~). This fompletes
oar t~~n~lrnrtiun uf Ih~~ w~qn~~llfl` ri' - {~ q~',lri ~)t~ i
I'hP fir,t Iwu conditiona for thP triple ((.'~~~, U", ri') to bP a 5f!IPf.tlOn dPVIfP Of G" ia
M are obviously tnet. Let q" - lim;-..,,; qi and p" s lim;..,~ p~. we shall prove the third
wnditioa that thP part x;(o; )- m, of implementation of D; is sequentially rational with
respPCt to N" in Rame G(U",q") for anY i E I and any a; E proj;(C'), by showing that
the heliPf systPm tt" is Pssrntially identical with thP belie( system tr. F'ix any i E I and any
o, E proj,(( "1. ('onsidrr any a-; E U' ;, anc h E H;, and any r E h. Then
i~r.rl x.(a;. a-;1)
9iI o,. a-, ITi~;I r. a-, )





l~~ qi(o;.à-;)Fïi(!l,è-~) }(1- ~ L L
)-Frt(y,~-~)
elt) Ar.i(jh.rt!'.) 8(t)) 9r(a~-a-~
Fe.r(in ó


















I)ne tu thP cxislenfP of thP bound l1', w11Pn we take a limit of tL'~ t(r, (o;, o-;)) with respect
to l, thP limit fan be Laken for the denominator and for the numetator separately. Then
by takiug a liruit further with respPCt to t, the limit of the denominator goes to
~ L.
Frr à-
' lim r.r(y~ ) 9r(a~.à-~)
I ven;.-,EO~ r~x xt,r(sh,aht)
lim ~ - l ~
~-~ B(L) Fr.rly,~-,) t(1- B~t)) - 1.
~j ~ 4rlo,.ir-;) lim
r-x Fr.r(rn.a" )
yEh d-,ED-, ~19
llrnce we runclnde that if a-, E U-;, then
!fu(.!.(O~ O-i)) - IÍ111
A T,O-,






~-~' At,t(xA.o"i) 9EA d-, ED-,
4i(or.o-;) Iim Ai.t(x,o-i)
f 1 1'0" at,l(xA. o~i) - llilx.
LB(1.) At 1(Y ó)
}((
~ LJ 4e(~r,ó-;) lim ' ' -' t-.~ At,1lxA,oh;) yEh d-,ED-,
At,(( x. Q-i )
9t(oi, A-; ) hm
1 !r~ At.l(2A,(fl~;)
- B(r)) LJ L~ 9i(~i.ir-;) lim AL1(y.~-i) ~
1~'w Ae.l(TA,oI`;)
yEA n-, E D-,
Ai.l(T,n-i )
(~t(O;,[r-,) IÍItI
1-~u 7rt.l(.rA, ehi )
fX ~ ~,
AI.1(y,?-i) 4~(o,.ïr-;) lim








1 1~~ At,r(ZA`~hi) ilim B~1! ~ ~




yEA d-, E D-,
I'hrrrfure the „`ynl`ntial r:rtiunality tif ..~(a, ) - a, wilh mnpcrt to ~r" iu the Ratne C( U',q")
r,~dures In Ihr neyuential ratiuuality of .aj(o;) - a; with respc~t to u in the game C(D,q).
'1'he latter is Ruaratlteed by the hypothesis of Lemma 2. ~~
Proof of Theorern 1 :
We vhaJl ron,t ruct a soyni~IlrC {( ('n", D", ~" )} ; 1 in df as follows. Sinre bf ~ 0 by Lemma
1, wr lakr :ul arbitran~ Iriplr in .tf :Ind eall it (I''l1,Ul,y1). llr.fine M(C'n1,U1.~'~1) -
{(("',U.tl) E AI~UI C U}. ,tl((~'I,UI,FIt) ~ N ninre ((~U1,U1.~,1) E hf(C.~I,Ui,pl).
By de(initiun il holde fur any (('ll. U, b~) E a1((~1, Ut , yl ) that F(x, D! ;) 1 b(x, D-;)
for any i E I, an,y h E H;, and any x E h. ft there exists (('o, D, bi) E hl(Cot DI ~1)zo
such that A(r,U!,)~A(r.U-;) for somP i E I, sotne h E Il;, and some r E h, take surh
(Co, U. t~) arbit.rarily and call it (C'01, D-, y2 ). Otherwise take an arbitrary (Co'', DZ, ~~) E
M(CA1, U1. yl ). By repeating t.he procedure, we havo a sequence {(Co", D",p")}~ t.
Examine the nature of the seqltence. Associated with the sequence, we have ~;EI ~hEH, ~(h)
seque`nces ( {A(r.U";)}'„-1),EI,hEll,.rEh. FOr earb i E I, each h E Il;, and each x E h,
thP seyuence {A(r.U",))n-1 is uouincreasinR and b(s,U";) ~ 0 for any n E N. 3ince
Z„Et ~,I~Ei4 ~(h 1 ís a fiuito number, there exists N E N snch that A(r, U-v;) - A(z, D",)
for any n 1:V', auy i E I, any h E H;, and any r E h. B,y the way o[ consttucting the
.eqw`nrh {(('c'",U" t,"1}'„`-1, this impliew that h(r,D!~,) - A(x,U-;) for any i E I, any
h E Il;, auy r E h, aud auy (Co,U,v) E a! with Uv C U. "1'hus the assunlption of
Lr`mma Y is satisficvl for (('uv. DN ~'v). Hence any selection by (Cbh~, Uw,FiN) is a robust
selertion. ~~
Proof of Lemma 3 :
F'ix auy ft'o. U.tl) E.t1 where U- r[;EI U;. ?}?(D) C U by dpfinition. We shall show
U C Ii(U). 1'ake aup a, E U;. By the following procedure, we can ftnd (Co',U',~') E M
with U' C U surh that Pither a; E proj;(C'') or m, E D; `Pro7;(Co') holds where C'' is a
selection by (C~~, D',4r'). Since ((~, D, ~) E M, there exiets N E N such that (C,b, D,W) E
,11~. ('all (C'o, U,t~) as (('w~. D"'.trv). If (CAN. U'~`~.~'v) can serve as (Ca~,D'.p'), then
we aro duue. So suppoxe nol, narnely rt; E proj;(lAN)`proj;(C'N) where C"N is a selection
by (CAN, U~, Nti~). "fhen, by definition of MN~, thereexists (C'ON-r, DN-t pN-1 ) E MN-1
Wlrh 1)'~-1 ~ 1)'~ sllfll lllal p; E Ur-t. If(!'ON-1 DN-I,f~N-t)can servea.c(Co'.D',fJ'),
tll(`II K'l` afl' :dtill dlllll'. kl'tll`:It thl' prll('1`dllr(' a~ It111J! a.ti W1` :trf' Illlt dU111` VPt.. 'I'IIIl: ff(`ateH
a sequence {(('o", U".p")}. It. is howPVer guaranteed that we can stop at latest at n- 0
wilh (('1"',l)n,ti') E.11~. tiinrr ("N' - L'~ Rnarantlrs that oither a, E prnj;(C.'.o) or
n, E U;' `prnj,(('no) holds. ftence there must exists 0 ~ n G N such that (Co" U",p")
can serve as (Co~. U', y; ). 'fhen the part .v~(o; )- o; of implementatious is seyuentially
rational with rnspc`c't to ~I' in garnP G(U',q') where j1 is a consistent belief implied by p'
and y' is a probability distribution over the set D' implied by p'. By the way ofconetructing
(C'o', U',t,i ), we know that U' C D. Hence a; is seryuentially rationalizable in U. ~~z)
Proof of Lemma 4 :
Dy d,~linitinu, th,~ uporatur Ii of ticyueutial ratioualizability is mouutone iu lhc w~nso thal
?it( U) C I2( U') for an,y product subsets D C U' C 2J. k'ix any (Co,U,}i) E M. By the
monotonirity uf the operator ii, we have ii(U) C?12(!') from U C ~. By conducting
thc opcration repeatedly, we have R"(D) C ái"(~') for any n E N. Lemma 3, however,
guarantms that U-!F?(U) -?F?!(U) - .-. - 92"(D) for any n E N. Hence we have
U C ~i"(L~) for any n E N. 'Chis gives us U C flnsái"(Z) - 9i'. ~~
Prooi of Lemma 6 :
Snppose that a triple (('u, D, y~) E~11 with a selertion C' satiafies the condition of Lemma
5. ('onsider any ((o~. D'.N') E af with D C D'. By i,emnta 4 we know that b(x,D' ;) -
h(r,~F1',) - h(r, U-;) for any i E I. auy Ir E H;. and any r E h. 'Theu Lemma 2 appliea to
gaarxntrw that thr, .ot (" is a rubnst .elert.ion. ~~
Proof of Lemma 8 :
Let (",((~,U,}~), aud !" be as assumed in Lemma 6. Take any (C'o~,Ur,}~') E !if by
whirh t he sr~l ("~ iti a. selr~c Iion. Ry I,emma d, t hen, lhe assumption of Lemrna 6 guarantees
that A(r, ~~~~( IJ~ U!)~ j) - b(x. ~I?';)- b(z, D-;) for any i E I, any h E H;, and any x E h.
By t hr, samc roustnu~tion ar in tbr~ prrxif of Lernma 2, we can construN. },", such that C."
is a sr,lrrtinn b,y ( IJ U IJ',]~[~Et( IJ; U D; ), }~," ). Hence ( U U D,, niE11 U; U U; ), p"r) E M.
Obvionsl}' U' C n;EI(U; U U;). In order for ("~ to be a robust selection by (C'o~,D',p'),
there must exist (Co~~. D", 4~") E.ti1 such that ~~Et( U; U U;) C D" and C' is a selection
by ((A~~, D", t~"). This is impossible by the supposition of Lemma 6. Hence C'~ is not a
robust selection. ~~
Proof of Theorem 2 :
Let ('" be a robust sPlertion by (C'o, U, }i) for a primitive game Ci where p-{c 4t,}te 1
}it. tiuppose to the contrary that some strategy profile a E C' is not a Nash eyuiGbrium in
game C. Then for aome player i, there exists his intormation set h E H; on the equilibrium
path ot n sueh that a; is not sequentially rational at h with respect to a h:reps and Wilson
( 19t32) cousistrnt hplief giveu o. Since h is on the equilibrium path of o, the consiatent
belicf at !r is ralculated hv liayes nrle as t`'`-' ) being the posterior that node x has
sE~ ~IY.o-,)zz




to denote t he probability that node y is reached when player j~ i plays the strategy ?~
and player i takes an actior! leading to node y whenever necessary. kor each node x E h and
each st.ratPgy profile ó E.ti.', let l~;(è~x) denote the conditional expected payoff to player i
(rom a play of ir given that node x has been reached. Then there must exist o~ E~; such
that
a(i,?.,1 , a(r.,?..,)




Now exalnine the sequential rationality of..,'(?;) - ?; at the information set UzEhUa-,Ep-,
{(z,l?;,ir-,))} for plaver r in game G(D,y) where q - limr-.,~ yr. F'or ea.ch t E N fixed,
let {nc~r}! t be the seyuenee of strategy profiles in C( U,9L) which genetates 1LL. Let al,t
be definerl a. in the proo( of Lemma Y. Since h is on the equiGbrium path of ?, we have
b(h.?-;) - 0. This guaraattPes that
rliln ~ ~ qr(?;,à-; )At,rly,~-;)-~ ~ 4s(?;,ó-;)x(y,à-;)
.vEh n-, ED-, yEh è-, EI)-,
? ~4L(?;,?-;)~(y,?-;)
yEh
'!'herefore, for each z E h and each ir-; E D-;,
qe(?;, ~-; )nr.l(x, ó-; ) !LC(r.(?;,~-;))- lim
r-x ~ ~ 4Ll?;,?-;)xl.!(y.~-;)
yEhn-,Efl. ,
9t (?;. á-; )A( x, á-; )
- ~ ~ qd?;,~-J~(y,~-,) .
yE h à-, E1)-,
F'url,hennore. since ? E~". t.he definition of (('u, D, ~) being a selection device implies that
limrti.x, yr(n;, ír-; ) ~ 0 if and ouly i[ 6-; -?-;. Therefore
(~ ~,.,..-., if à-; - ?-;
~L(I.(O;,?-i)) - llnl Pt(.r'.(?i,?-i)) - LhEn ~(y,o-,1
L-~x. 0 otherwise.23
Hence wP compare the couditional expected payoffs to player i o( chanRing to o; and of
irnpletnenting o; at the information set UrEy U,-,Ep-, {(z,(o;,á-;))} in the game C(D,q)
a9
~ ~ Ir(r.(~:.ir-:))(f~l(o~,ir-~)It) - ~ ~ lilz,(o~.~-~1)L':(Io~.è-t)Ij)





rEh uEA ~r ~-i rs:A uEA y. i)
7'hus the parl ,~(n;) - o; of the intplementatiwt is not sequentially rational for p)ayer i)n
G(U,y). "1'hi, is a coulradict.ion. II
Proof of Proposition :
1'irst cunsidPr thr~ case of ur~lrí„ItH).ttir'i„lfFr)) ~ urr(ri~(4.).t~.ri,.lt~)). For each
(i,ri~) E R}. IM. l,(eli.ri~) : Hf - H~ riPOOte a fuuctiou which satisfies u,(e,lr(elc,w)) -
ut(ï, ti~). Let ( i, ri~), (ï', ri.') be two intersections of a line w- f}re and a curve w-
Iri(rlcir(fl.),fit~~ltL)) such that (i,ri,) G(c~~(tt).t~eicltL)) G(ë',ti~'). Find pt snch
that a line rr -;i(pr )e is tauRent to a curve rn - Ir„(cIF', u~'). The tangPnt line exists since
the curve u~ - l,,,(cIr'. u~') is cotn~ex given the assumptions about urH(e, w). F'urthermore,
the assaroption of u,,lFí„(4r).fi~Fí„(f1~)) ~ nac(E'icltr.).fe~'í,,(t~.I) guarantees pr G 1,
and thc "single crossing property" guarantees pt ~ 0. Take any p E (pt,l) fixed. We
shall show that a robust se)ection supports the pooling outcome (e~~~ (,(!(p)),(3(p)eiN(~i(p))),
Construct the foI)owing sequential Pquilibrium a'. The worker chooses the education level
e~„(:3(p)) witó probability one. The firms bid the wage ~3(p)eiH((3(p)) to the education level
r,„(.i(P)), a wa.Re Irtr to auy education Ir~vrl r E~ï',t~z), aud x wage tf,c to any other
education level r'. I,et (C,'o, U, ~) E Mu be a primitive selection device of Co - {o"}. Let
(C'or, D',~') E M be any selection device with D C D'. We shall construct the following
triplr, (('r'r~ D",t,~'). Lr,l n" bo a soqurnl.ia.l r.quilibrintu iu whicó thr~ fr, wurkor chrN,sen
Fi~ (t~,) with probabilit;v one. the tn worker chooses èr with probability oae, and the firms
biJ nriu[trrr, t,, lrlri,,(tt.l,ff.ri~lfr.))~ lo any r~dural.iuu levcl r E Irt. Let h,' be a set uf
education kvcls which are assigned positive probabilities by some worker's strategies in D'.
I,et (r,ui) I~e an intersection of a line m- tHr aod a curvP m- I,„(rleí~~(tt,),ttciH(tt))
surh t.hat ( e, u' ) c(r irr( t ~), t Lcí~r (f~, )). 'I'xke auy education ]evel e E N' fl [e, ê') and define a24
workor's stratc.f{~ d whirh pmseribes t.he pur~~ action c tu t.he tf, wurker and the pure action
P' to the fy wurker. Now set Co~~ - D' U{a"}. Let the set of worker's strategies in D"
eonsist of the worker's strat.egies in U', the worker's strategy of rr", and UpgF,n(e,t~l{o~ }.
Let the set. of firms~ strategies in U" consist oC the firms' strategies in D' and the firms'
strategies of o". Finall,y set. ~" as follows. Let {ei}it be a sequenre oí small positive
ntunbers ronverging to zera For any strategy profile o E D" such that a~ o' and o asaigns
to the firms the strategies of a', set qi (o) - Ei if and only if o assigns to the worker ejther
a strategy n~ for sume e E E'fl [i, è') or the strategy of o". For any st.rategy profile a E D"
sach I hat o ~ a' and o assigns to the worker either a strategy oj for some e E E fl [ë, ë') or
the strateyv of o", set yi(a) - cc if and only if o assigns to the firms the strategies of o".
Fur an~ ul.hrr ~trategy profile o E U" Pxcept n', set q~(o) - ri. 7'6e probablitY që(~~) gets
all the remaininR weight. Let q" - limc-,;, q~'. Imagine a ronsistent belief tr" of G(D",q")
su~~li Ihat, if a lirm is as~iRu~~d Ihe atrategy of o', Ihen his postcriur uf the If~ workcr is
zrro to any educa.tion IPVPI r E(0.f'1 `{c~x(,3(p))}, p to the education level e~H(,Q(p)), and
onP to atn uthe education IeveL Given qi' thus cunstructed, we can find such a consistent
belief of (.'(D".y") for tha following reason. Suppose that a firm is assigned the strategy
of o'. For any r Q l:' U{~'}, his posterior of the tH worker can be any point in [0,1].
So con,ider any c E E U{~'}. If ~ G r, his pusterior of the tff worker cau be zero, since
any worker's stratPqy which assigns such e tu the tH worker with a positive probability is
not sequentiall,y rationali2able and, by hemma 4, is not in D'. If e~ è', his posterior of
the trf worker ean be une by a sytnmettic argument.. Finally consider an education level
r E [r.~']. His posterior lo r - ei~~(~3(p)) is that the worker haF chosen this e believing
the strategy uf a', tltat is, the worker is ty with probability p. }Iis pueterior to f- e' ts
that the work~r ha.v rhosen this r believing Pither a stratc~gy oi for some P E F, f1 [è,é')
ur tbe strategY uf rr", Lbal is, tbe wurker is fti wilh prubability une. Ilis pusterior to
e~ r~N(~1(p)) or i' is that the wurker has chosen this r helieving the strategy o~ , that is,
the worker is tl, with probabilit.y one. 'Chus we have a consiatent belief as described above.
Now wP shall show that the triplP (t~~~, D", ~") is a selection device of {o`}. It is rational
for thP wurker to implement the strategy of o' expeeting that the firms will implement
the st.rategies o( a" with probability uue. Given the consistent belief {t", it is also rational
for the firms to implement the strateqies of o'. So examine the seyuential rationality of25
iwplr'uroutiuq a stratr`qy a~ for canc ~ E 1; f1 [r,i'). If the worker is assigned thP strategy
oi , he expects that the firms will implement the strategies o( o". By the definitions of é, é'
and b}' 1hr~ as~nmptiou o( er,.(ri„lt~r ),txfr,r(tn)) 1 rtt, (rir.(t~),iLC'ir.(t[,)), we know that
í ~ r aud,IhNrefore.rniu[t[[c.lt~lc~c'ic(tt,),t[.e'iL(t~))) - 1e~(e~eir.(t[.).l~eé~(t~)). Heuce
the t[, worker maximizes his utilit,y by choosing the prescribed e, expecting the firms' bid
u' - 1,c(c~eiL(tL),tLr'i,,ltc)). Hy the "single crossing property" and by the assumption
of ~rc('ír,(tr[).l![ciulttt)) ~ ut,(fir(t~),t~cic(tc)). ou the other hand, the ty worker
maximizPS his utility hy choosing é'. Thus the triple (C'a~`, D",b~") is a selection device of
{o'} in .1.1. Ilenre the st`I {o'} is a robust select.ion.
A sitnilar idr~a tn thP xbove constrnctinn of (C'o~~, D",~") also applies to support the
('ho- Kmps onlrume for any p E (0. 1) iu thP caseof u,c (ern (tH ), tHr.eu ( tK )) ~ utc (prL (tL ), tLr.re (I!. )).
('un.idrr a.,-qor,nti:rl r~quilibrirnu n... iu whiró thr tr, wr,rkrr chur,nr,a , ~~ (tr.) wil.ó prub:~
bilily oue, Ihe Ir[ workr.r chooses i' with probability one, and the firms bid a waqe tf,e to
any r~dnr atirru Irvr~l e F ~I1.,') :rnd a wakr~ ttrr Ir, any othrr t'ducatiou Irvel c. Hy mplacin);
n' by' n"' iu thP abovP conntrurtion of (('o~~, D" b,"), wP ran prove that a singleton set
{a"'} iti a rubnst aeleetiuu fur auc p E ((1. 1).
`PXLCOnUrInPtUfprlSldertllPrafieof7LlL(rr„ItN),tHfix(tH)) ~ u,~(e~i(tL).t[.ei~(tL)),
7'hen tht`reoxi,ts(ru.u'ulsurh that wo - 1tr(ro~rir.(tL)~tLfic(t[,)) - 1tH(c'o~eiH(t~).l~etH(ta)).
Lt~t p,r ~(l be such Ihxt arn -.ilpo)ro. 'I'he assumption of urc("i,~(ty),tHeêx(t[t)) )
urc('~,(tt,)'tr,~i,,(tt.)) Kuaranlrr. po C I. l'nrlhr~rmom, pp ~ pI sinre u,Hle',w') 1
u,,,(cn.n~r,) - u,,,(c~N(t~),tfe~x(t[,)). Take au,y p E (O.po) fixed. ~Ve shall show that, for
such p, the ('ho-Kreps outrome supported by the sequential equilibrium a"' is the only out-
comP nnpportr~d by au} robust sPlertion. ('onsider any selection device (l'o, D, K,) of some
srl (". tinppose that soure strateRy pro(ile an E(" prescribes a dilferent outcome from the
('ho-hreps nutromP. 13}' Th~omm 'l, the st.ratcgy profile a~ must be a Nash equilibríum.
"I'his Nash eynilibrium ,hould not allow alry f11IIy ptxlllll~, OULCOme Rin(',P therP Is 110 (c, w)
surh that u~ - 3(P)r~. rc ~ Ir,(r'~Fi, (t~ ).tr,r~ir.lt[,)). and vn 1 ltrr(!~r'iR(tt),t[.eirr(tt,)). BY
I hr~ .:rmr~ rra.uu, r lrr r,yuililrriutu rt'~ .buuld rlllt IlO A. f1:LrtI:LIIV pUUIIIIR PIt11111I1r111111 iu which
the t~ workPr takefi some pnre action eo and the t[[ worker chooses the education level
ro with a probahilitv in (0, I). Ilence n~ nnr~t bt' one of the following two types ot Nash
eyuilibria. '['he first type is a partially poolinq eyuilibrium ín which the t[l worker takes26
some pure artion co ~ è', thP tl, worker takes education levPls Pi~(f!,) and eo with positive
probabilities aud tór firmv bid u~u - lrc(fo~ri~(ft),tteir(GL)) to the education level eo.
The other t~~pe is a (ully separatinR eyuiGbriutu in which the t~, worker takes the pure
artion r~r ( tt,) and the ttt worke~r takes some pure action eo 1 ë'. Consider the first type
equilibrium. B,y the "single crossing property", we can find (e', w') on the line w- tye
surh that r' 1 r' and utH(r',w') ~ utx(eo,wo). I,et n"" be a sequential equilibrium in
which the tt, worker rhouses r~~(t!,) with probabiGt,y one, the t!t worker chooses e' with
probability une. aud tlte linns bid a wage t~rir(ty) t.o [he educx[iun level rit(t!,) and a
waRe lttr' to the eJucation lecel c'. Ry the sarne argumPnt as for p E (pt, I), we can prove
that t he sinqletun sPl {o"' } is a rubust selertion h,y somP selection device ( C'~~,1)', gi') such
that O C I)' and o"',a"" E D'. Aut there is no selection device (Co",D",~") of C,'
wi~ h IY ~ I)" ,iurr,, if a linu i., aaiKur,d t ht~ a ratr,w nf rrrt a.ud srr. r', t hen he iti fnrred tn
believe that Ihe worker is tH with probability one and his best respottse bid f!!e' induces
the !tr workr~r tndeviate fruru n't aud rhonse Ihocvluration level r'. "1'hus Iho sM (" is nol. a
robust selectiun. ( 'onsider the remaininR possibitity of the second type equilibrium. Define
(e',u~') tiurh tbat r' -~ anel u~ - I71e'. ~Tlteu r' 1 Ë-' aud uter(r'.tn') 1 tntn('o,ttlc'0),
'fhrreforo tho .ante arRument as for t.hr first t}~pe eyuilibrium applies. "Che set (," is not a
robust. selertiun.
LasUy lu tóe rase of ut,.(r'~N(In).ltlci„lfl!)) C utc(ci~(tt.).tt,r'et(tt)) applies also au
arqwneut similar t.o the one for the case of nrc (ei„1tt!)~tuei„(tH)) ~ uac (Fit, ( t[,), tteir.(ti))
wit.h p E(tl,pnl. Let o"`' be a spyuential equilibrium exactly as a" except that the tq
wurker chou,e, not r' but r ~rr (f!t ) wi1 h probabilil,y one. :11su let a""' he a sequential equi-
librituu exactl,y as o"' except that the tH worker chooses not é' but eix(ty) with proba-
bility one. 'I'hou let o"'' and n"' replace n' aud a" in the ronstrurtion oC((ro~r, D",~")
ÍOi tllP rafiP of nrc(Firr(tN).tHr~~rr(ty)) ~ ut~.(E'i~(t~).tteir.(tG)) with P E (Pt, 1). We can
pntce Ihxt a siuKletuu ,el {n...'} ix a rohutit selortion aud Lbat Ihe ('huRreps oulcome
Ihus supported by o""' iti the unly outrome supported by a ruhust selertirnt. II27
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